Transboundary dialogues and cooperation for water security: facing South Asia’s greatest climate threat

South Asia has the worst water scarcity statistics in the world (Science X, 2023). While poverty, power asymmetries, and internal inequalities, are the driving factors, climate change exacerbates the water issue with detrimental changes in weather patterns leading to catastrophic flood and drought seasons (Klaesener-Metzner, 2022). An estimated three-quarters of the region grapples with high water stress levels (Aamer, 2023). According to a UNICEF article, heightened water insecurity causes developmental stunning, increases malnutrition and disease spread, and threatens agricultural systems and food security (Sidhu, 2023). This directly impacts political stability and security. Communities often break out into violent (and non-violent) conflict over water resources due to rigid ownership norms and reluctance to share with neighbours (Kolås et al, 2013). Through the Water-Energy-Food (WEF) Nexus, conflict and water stress tighten food and water supplies, inflating prices, and further undermining regional security. In light of this, water insecurity is perhaps South Asia’s greatest cross-border climate threat, driving changes in the WEF nexus and increasing regional economic and social risks that threaten political stability.

However, more than a concentrated issue, climate change is a threat with possible inter-regional spillover effects and repercussions. It can impact international migration and security measures, economic growth, and politics beyond South Asia. But how does the WEF nexus mechanism play out? Why does it drive these changes, and how can the region mitigate this climate issue? What role does water cooperation and open dialogue play in the growing water security threat? And how can the region utilize internal and external solutions to face this issue?

These are a few of the questions this blog posts seeks to explore.

Image Source: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/water-security-in-south-asia-running-dry-and-running-out-of-options

Water Insecurity, the Water-Energy-Food Nexus, and Political Instability

Climate change exacerbates extreme weather events and disrupts water availability in South Asia. The 2022 Pakistan floods are an example of such an anomaly. A growing population, urbanization, and industrialization mean greater food and water demand, highlighting the need to address the Water-Energy-Food (WEF) Nexus (Rasul and Neupane, 2021, page 1). By 2030, the Himalayan glaciers are expected to lose 10-30% of their entire mass, which could have devastating consequences for water security in the region (Aamer, 2023). The Hindu Kush Himalayas’ snow and glaciers feed ten major rivers, in South Asia these are the Indus, Ganges, Meghna, and Brahmaputra (figure 1). These rivers serve 210 million people directly and another 1.3 billion downstream of the rivers, including in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh (Scott et al, 2019). According to Rasul and Neupane (2021) “some 277 million people are undernourished in South Asia” and around “1.5 billion people… depend on predominantly… agriculture as their main source of livelihood” (page 3). Agriculture is at the root of the WEF nexus, involving all three sectors. Thus, the Himalayas sustain the water-food-energy security nexus which ensures the socio-economic and political stability of South Asian communities (Scott et al, 2019).

The WEF security nexus concept is relatively new in the global community and is understood as a triad of interdependent sectors (Scott et al, 2019). The nexus provides a set of synergies and tradeoffs between resources, institutions, and security, linking them with resource use and development to address multi-dimensional issues (Scott et al, 2019). For example, South Asian food production now uses more water and energy, while per capita land availability has significantly decreased. This forces farmers to increase water and fertilizer use, which has recently increased in price since the Ukrainian war (Rasul and Naupane, 2021; Xie and Zhu, 2022). Additionally, food production requires energy for agricultural machinery, land preparation, and post-harvest processes such as drying, milling, packing, storing, and processing (Rasul and Naupane, 2021). The WEF nexus explicitly indicates the cross-sectoral implications of one resource vis a vis another. The growing water stress level thus directly links to the diminishing livelihood sustainability in the South Asian region. These livelihood interferences appear as greater societal disturbances, perpetually exacerbated by the growing water-climate threat.

Figure 1 - Rivers of the Hindu-Kush-Himalaya Region (Scott et al. 2019)

Water insecurity disrupts state political security and stability through the WEF nexus channel with implications beyond regional communities and borders. Water scarcity and availability disruption increase the risk and volatility of domestic and cross-border conflicts (Abbott et al, 2017). These conflicts are exacerbated by water hegemony and power distribution inequities in the South Asian region, particularly in India, concerning the imbalance with surrounding smaller economies (Chadha, 2020; Abbott et al, 2017). Food insecurity issues, such as increased and volatile food prices, and food shortages lead to social unrest, deterioration of democracy, and civil conflicts. Abbott et al. (2017) note this is especially true for low-income countries prevalent in South Asia. According to Agarwal (2013) grievances driven by food insecurity fuel rebel movement recruitment, like the Naxalites in India or the Maoists in Nepal. Governments that cannot adequately provide broad or targeted food assistance are more vulnerable to insurgencies with heightened food insecurity (Agarwal, 2013). This is channelled through social movements of recruits in marginalized areas, particularly with weak governance. Moreover, energy insecurity issues, such as affordable energy inaccessibility, inadequate electricity supply, and fuel price shocks, threaten social and political stability (Abbott et al, 2017). Water is a source of hydroelectricity, and disruptions in consistent top-down river flows affect the electricity supply. Therefore, this can force developing countries to shift to non-renewable energy (oil, gas, coal) given the social and political unrest over electricity. Ensuring the stability of water supplies and the overall WEF Nexus reduces socioeconomic tensions and improves political stability.

Hydro-Diplomacy as Cooperation and Dialogue

The urge for competition and division of resources drives the absence of cooperation. This impediment is largely a product of history, stemming from the deindustrializing colonial legacy and the days of partition as the physical construction of respective borders is also social (Chadha, 2020). The 1960 India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty and the 1996 India-Bangladesh Ganges Water Sharing Treaty are successful cooperation examples implemented earlier. However, political relationships are declining along with hydro-diplomacy (Aamer, 2023). Recently, India rejected a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) order on the Indus Water Treaty, to halt the construction of a hydroelectric powerplant on the western rivers dedicated to Pakistan according to the treaty (Bhattacharya, 2023). Pakistan deemed the projects would reduce its control over the water resources, escalating tensions in the bilateral relationship. Separately, following a consecutive visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to New Delhi on the sharing of water from the Teesta tributary of the Brahmaputra, the Indian government refused any agreements, indicating the regional diplomatic demise (Bhattacharya, 2022). Besides dwindling Pakistan-India-Bangladesh relations, the Afghani government denied signing any Kabul River sharing agreements with Pakistan, due to a “lack of data, negotiating skill, [and] incomplete water policy” (Ali, 2022). The growing South Asian water tensions require greater cooperation and dialogue to improve hydro-diplomatic relationships (Chadha, 2020).

The Drin Basin Dialogue, the SADC Multistakeholder Dialogue, and the regional Brahmpatura Dialogue are successful examples of such hydro-diplomacy (Water Diplomacy). The Drin Dialogue of the Balkans shared a vision for the sustainable management of the Drin River Basin. Participants enabled numerous dialogue advancements, such as successful nexus assessments, enhancement of cooperation, and adoption of public participation plans (The Drin Dialogue, 2016). These resulted in a long-term shared vision for transboundary basin management, creating a cooperative Drin Basin institution, and regular meetings evaluating key issues linked to water resource management. The South African Development Community (SADC) Multistakeholder Dialogue is a biennial initiative that gathers water experts, and decision- and policy-makers from different sectors to discuss development challenges, related to the water-food-energy nexus (Outcomes of the 6th SADC Multi-stakeholder Water Dialogue, 2013). The dialogue established numerous policy documents and sub-committees to manage water-related development issues. Moreover, it engaged the private sector, regional cooperation platforms, and expanded institutional mandates. Lastly, the Brahmaputra Dialogue launched by the South Asian Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies (SaciWATERs) is a basin-wide dialogue for transparency and cooperation over the Brahmaputra river (Barua, 2018). It united civil society members, non-governmental actors, and academic experts on multi-national levels, increasing transparency and awareness of the water issue.

Therefore, to contend with the regional climate threat, the South Asian nations should establish effective mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation similar to the Drin Basin, the SADC, and the Brahmaputra Dialogues. This includes regular multistakeholder meetings, joint commissions for shared visions and policy streamlining, and coordination on agreements to manage water resources equitably and sustainably. Foundational institutions and dialogue platforms exist within the region, such as the SaciWATERs. Moreover, cooperation and open dialogue would lead to additional benefits, beyond pan-governmental policy collaboration. Dialogue platforms can enhance transparency and share hydrological data among all stakeholders to make informed decisions concerning regional water security and simultaneously build trust. By providing access to accurate and timely data on water flow, usage, and quality, South Asian states can develop efficient water management strategies that prevent potential cross-boundary and communal water conflicts. Dialogue promotes information transparency, thus incentivising other solutions by providing awareness and accessibility for water insecurity. Such action reduces regional water insecurity, besides mitigating price levels on food and energy through the WEF Nexus and pre-empting social and political instability. Furthermore, improved relationships and trust capacities can lead to additional cooperation beyond water. These include infrastructure upgrades, trade facilitation, and multilateral and private-sector engagement.

Conclusion

Water insecurity is an existential threat to South Asia driven by climate change and exacerbated by factors like population growth, urbanization, and industrialization. Through the Water-Energy-Food nexus, diminishing water resources directly disrupt food and energy security, inflating prices and catalyzing social unrest, civil conflicts, and political instability in the region. Notably, the region's shared watercourses originating from the Hindu Kush Himalayas, make transboundary cooperation over water resources imperative for ensuring economic development and political stability. Although South Asia has examples of successful water-sharing efforts in the past, escalating hydropolitical tensions and the lack of transparency and dialogue threaten to derail contemporary regional cooperation. To mitigate the destabilizing potential of water insecurity, South Asian nations must pursue robust dialogue mechanisms modelled on successful examples like the Drin Basin Dialogue, the SADC Multistakeholder Dialogue, and the regional Brahmaputra Dialogue.

Ultimately, enhancing regional cooperation and pursuing hydro-diplomacy is crucial for South Asian nations to confront the greatest cross-border climate threat of water insecurity. By promoting transparency, bringing all stakeholders together, and incentivizing regional solutions, hydro-diplomacy can mitigate water stress, ensure food and energy security through the WEF nexus, prevent conflicts, and safeguard political stability in South Asia. References

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