Human rights are universal...?

The recent Asian Values debate has sparked numerous questions regarding the cultural relativism of international human rights, whether they are indeed universal. Specifically, this concerns their birth and objective purpose after WWII. Certain political philosophers argue that these are uniquely Western norms that evolved to overlay Judeo-Christian values upon the rest of the world despite cultural differences (Kausikan, 1993). It is necessary to consider the parties that conceived these rights as well as whom they are acted upon in the international community, in the context of global justice and ethics. Human rights are only universal in so far as they reflect the fundamental moral norms found across all societies, as they ought not be political tools that prescribe societies how to act or organize themselves, which is a function of their own historical, cultural, and economic circumstances.

According to recent history, to what extent do modern human rights maintain "fundamental universality"? Whose values are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

This blog post argues that the contemporary Declaration for Human Rights does not with certainty reflect international values of cultures as prescribed, and therefore needs to be revised.

Image Source: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1226711.shtml

Human rights are an instrument used for political interactions in international law. Under David Easton’s definition of politics, they are therefore utilized for “the authoritative allocation of values” (Kausikan, 2021). Their naissance lies in the ideas of Western philosophers, jurists, and theorists, upon whom cosmopolitan notions of values and norms are based on today (Armstrong, 2011, pg. 2121; Baek, 2018, pg. 80). These values were officially recognized and codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after the horrors of two world wars (Kausikan, 2021). Yet by then, much of the world was still under colonial subjugation or had already represented European views such as Latin America (Baek, 2018, pg. 81). Asian delegates representing Eastern sovereignties at the UDHR adoption such as Charles Malik and Peng-chun Chang, were arguably also ‘Westernized’ through their intellectually European educations in the US (Baek, 2018, pg. 81). Hence, the declaration lacked the conviction of cosmopolitanism, and any representation of universality in regard to cultural relativism. Whilst these rights were established in consideration of the belief of cosmopolitanism, they failed to hold all others in the international society as “equal members of a larger, global community”, by excluding the beliefs of diverse societies (Armstrong, 2011, pg. 2122). The Cold War was a period of additional disorders and changes for the declaration, with the Third World States placing serious Human Rights issues atop of the UN agenda “including colonialism, self-determination, racial discrimination, apartheid, the right to development and economic, social and cultural rights” (Armstrong, 2011, pg. 2126; Baek, 2018, pg. 82). With the end of the cold war, human rights were utilized as a guide by the Western states, criticizing any cultural deviations as politically incorrect representing non-compliance to the so-called ‘universal’ code of human rights (Kausikan, 1993, pg. 28).

Human rights ought to be morals that are fundamentally found across international societies, irrespective of a nation’s cultural, historical, or economic background, “to be applicable to all human beings” (Baek, 2018, pg. 81). The rich diversity of political structures and cultural traditions outside of Western states, therefore, prevents the establishing of a “coherent human rights regime” since it does not represent Asian Values of “Confucianist, Buddhist, Islamic, or Hindu traditions” for example (Kausikan, 1993, pg. 26). These cultural traditions depict values that constitute the political organization of these individual societies, and thus human rights as a Western concept interferes with Eastern political notions by setting a standard set of values that emphasizes a particular ‘correct’ manner of political organization. A mode of democratic individualistic organization that is foreign to many Asian states who find community action rather more convincing and normative (Amrstrong, 2011). Asian Values are not alien principles that have no relation to the fundamental values of the West, they contain similar or identical norms and interests that likewise claim universality “such as the territorial integrity of the state or the fundamental nature of their political system” (Kausikan, 1993, pg. 26). Therefore, as Asian countries politically align themselves with the mainstream human rights movement, they pursue narratives that are “in line with their own cultures, histories, and special circumstances” (Kausikan, 1993, pg. 26). Hence for example, many Asian countries are successful in fighting the recent COVID-19 pandemic, which in relation to the US or Europe, have differing political systems that bear their own strengths and dysfunctionalities that are absent in the West (Kauskian, 2021).

As a product of Western concepts, human rights act as political instruments that serve to influence other international actors into compliance of certain domestic interests. These interests then pressure Asian states into economic, social, and cultural changes that are perceived as unwarranted “thorny problems” by the East (Kausikan, 1993, pg. 36). For example, Beitz notes that “a government’s human rights record may determine eligibility for development assistance programs” as is the case for international financial institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank (Beitz, 2001, pg. 269; Armstrong, 2011, pg. 2132). The recent extension of “rights and freedoms in international human rights law… [such as that of] pay, work conditions, trade unions, standard of living, rest and leisure, welfare and social security, women’s and children’s rights, and the environment” places emphasis on the additional political pressure employed by the West to link economic concerns with human rights (Kausikan, 1993, pg. 28). This is particularly evident with globalization and the rapid development of Third World States, which raises concerns of competitiveness for developed countries that prefer to retain their hegemonic roles as great economies of the world (Kausikan, 1993; Kausikan, 2021). However, besides becoming economics pressures, human rights are also unequally applied across the global community in international tribunals, serving as a de facto political tool to justify unilateral intervention for example (Armstrong, 2011). Arguably there are doubts about the use of these rights upon Western states themselves, questioning further the universality of their application. Kausikan notes that the International Criminal Court “has only prosecuted individuals from weak countries”, thus carrying a double standard in human rights diplomacy (Kausikan, 2021).

Nevertheless, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is still regarded as a moral touchstone that serves as a “standard of assessment and criticism” against common negative injunctions (Beitz, 2001, pg. 269). The strict narrowing of these rights may seem rather rhetorical as undeniably the international human rights doctrine is not meant “to fill the same conceptual space” as natural rights or natural law in international law (Beitz, 2001). Moreover, Beitz argues that “it may seem excessively pragmatic to regard human rights as a ‘political conception’ (Beitz, 2001, pg. 280). Even though they are a selection of moral standards set to prevent future atrocities, their lack of initial input fails to be apolitical by David Easton’s definition of politics (Kausikan, 2021). That is since the ‘authoritative values’ of a select party (here the West) were not representative of additional parties onto which they were prescribed upon (here the East) – that is to say that the politics of the two counterparts differed. It is not reasonable to completely condemn human rights, but to provide greater political neutrality they ought to be revised in the face of developing cultural, historical, and economic circumstances of the globalizing cosmopolitan world (Beitz, 2001).

Indeed, for the UDHR to become a true international ethical code that pertains to the world society, “human rights… must be construed more narrowly” to reflect genuinely common concerns (Beitz, 2001, pg. 269). Therefore, in so far as they are vastly broad and culturally irrelative, states – such as that of the West – are capable of using the human rights agenda as a political instrument to pursue their interests in international politics.

These interests are universal to the extent that they do not prescribe anything that is practically useful to societies about how to act or organize themselves without cultural relativity.

References

Armstrong, David. “Evolving conceptions of justice in international law.” Review of International Studies, vol. 37, no. 5, 2011, pp. 2121–2136, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210511000350.

Baek, Buhm-Suk. “IV. Universality of Human Rights, but Not Uniformity of Implementation?” The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 6, no. 1, 2018, pp. 80–84, https://doi.org/10.1163/22134484-12340101.

Beitz, Charles R. “Human Rights as a Common Concern.” American Political Science Review, vol. 95, no. 2, 2001, pp. 269–282, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401992019.

Kausikan, Bilahari. “Asia’s different standard.” Foreign Policy, no. 92, 1993, pp. 24–41, https://doi.org/10.2307/1149143.

Kausikan, Bilahari. “The ‘Asian Values’ Debate, 30 Years On.” The Straits Times, 16 Mar. 2021.