Afghanistan's stabilization saga. A tale of poor governance, reckless strategy, and terrorist resilience.

Since the 19th century, Afghanistan has been an arena of British-Tsarist Russia collisions. The tribal and religious complexities of the local population and the perpetual instability led to consistent shifts in forms of government. By the turn of the millennium, the state witnessed a Soviet invasion, a civil war, and a takeover by Islamist nationalists – the Taliban (Shad and Iqbal, 2021, pg. 23-24). The state’s governance was incapacitated for decades, fostering an environment ripe for insurgent activity, extremist groups, and populace division, eventually culminating in the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States. Immediate efforts to stabilize the state were implemented by the US military in a disposition of the Taliban government, however, after 20 years of state development the effort was flat-out a failure. Stabilizing Afghanistan by the U.S. and its allies proved a challenge based on the state’s governance weaknesses, U.S. strategic errors, and terrorist group resiliency, underscoring the need for improved strategies to engage with emerging threats after the withdrawal of NATO troops. 

How did the historical context of Afghanistan's poor governance undermine the US and NATO state stabilization efforts? How does poor governance create an environment for terrorist groups to thrive in?

These are a few questions this blog post will explore in relation to regional security and stability.

Image Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghanistan-one-year-later-consequences-responsibilities

Governance and Sovereignty

The stability of Afghanistan hinges on its governance and the exercise of its sovereign power. According to Fukuyama (2004), the essence of sovereignty is compromised by poor governance, defined as the lack of institutional ability to apply and maintain policies due to the absence of political legitimacy (p. 96). The enforcement of policies, the establishment of legal authority, and the resolution of state conflicts depend crucially on security forces. At the same time, the presence of robust institutions is vital for fostering economic growth, thereby ensuring the nation's prosperity, stability, and social welfare (Jones, 2008, p. 8). Historically, Afghanistan has functioned as a collection of tribal ethnic groups with limited government reach beyond the capital, indicating a lack of broad governance (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 101). Leaders of the central government were either forced to subdue or negotiate with local ethnic-tribal leaders, although these groups managed to live in harmony (Daudzai, 2021, p. 21). Thus, governance was predominantly confined to the area around Kabul and was considered ineffective in the broader context of the modern Afghan state. Additionally, Daudzai (2021) points out that the arrival of foreign entities in the area contributed to conflict and instability. The prolonged history of conflict has created a contentious environment, vying for dominance and continually weakening the central governmental structure's capacity to implement and uphold policies (Shad and Iqbal, 2021, p. 24).

Stabilization efforts in the conflict-ridden state proved a difficult task since they required long-term plans and a coherent strategy that effectively engaged with the historically weak governance and the social characteristics. This was precisely missing in the US strategic approach to reconstructing the Afghan state. Their efforts to create a Western-style democracy and a central government did not consider the country's historical governance issues, as well as the ethnic complexities and social structures. This approach failed to gain broad support across Afghanistan's diverse population and contributed to the government's further weakness as scattered pockets of Taliban fighters throughout Afghanistan questioned the government’s legitimacy and warlords contended for power (Daudzai, 2021, pg. 154-157; Fukuyama, 2004, pg. 95). The Afghan government's lack of representation across regions and its reliance on corrupt and elite-centric governance [the Karzai government] alienated the local populace, providing the Taliban with opportunities to establish parallel administrative systems in rural areas, thereby undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state-building efforts (Shad and Iqbal, 2021, pg. 24-28). The US intervention, while initially successful in dismantling the Taliban regime, did not ensure security and proper governance throughout the state and thus failed to quell the Taliban insurgency that re-emerged in 2005. This was partly due to the US's security focus shifting to Iraq, which allowed the Taliban to reorganize and strengthen their insurgency against US-led forces and the Afghan government (Shad and Iqbal, 2021, pg. 27). The US's state-building efforts were overly ambitious and detached from Afghan realities on the ground, as security forces were shifted away from the government, and the government lacked legitimacy due to corruption (Shad and Iqbal, 2021, pg. 27-31; SIGAR, 2021, pg. 9-69).

Strategic Errors and Terrorist Resiliency

The failure of US strategic stabilization efforts nurtured terrorist group resiliency in the perimeters of the state, as evident by the growth of consecutive internal threats pre-2005 insurgency. The lacklustre of institutional capacity and, therefore of security forces to secure a monopoly over violence in the state, allowed entrenched extremist groups to flourish. These entities found themselves less vulnerable to monitoring and targeting, with increased space to forge new collaborations and plan operations both within the region and further abroad (White, 2022). Similarly, extremist group existence persisted after 2005, namely the Al-Qaeda and later ISIS. The presence of a large pool of experienced armed labour, consisting of former Taliban, Afghan security forces, and other militant ranks, further complicated the security landscape, challenging efforts to identify and mitigate threats (White, 2022). Further exacerbating these challenges were the unrealistic and expedited timelines that prioritized immediate expenditure over the creation of sustainable governance structures, leading to widespread corruption and diminished stabilization program effectiveness (SIGAR, 2021, pp. 23-37). Additionally, the Afghan government's financial and capacity constraints undermined the sustainability of institutions and infrastructure projects, worsened by inadequate monitoring and evaluation practices (SIGAR, 2021, pp. 39-46). This environment of persistent insecurity not only hampered reconstruction but also facilitated the expansion of extremist groups by creating governance vacuums in rural administrations and hindering economic development (SIGAR, 2021, pp. 59-69). A critical lack of understanding of the Afghan context by the US government, marked by insufficient awareness of local dynamics, also nurtured the conditions for corruption and the flourishing of extremist entities, undermining efforts to strengthen governance and address the roots of instability (SIGAR, 2021, pp. 9-21, 71-80).

NATO Withdrawal and the Emanating Threats – Lessons Learned

After the withdrawal of NATO troops in 2021, Afghanistan has seen a complex landscape of emanating terrorist threats from within. Two years since the takeover of the Taliban, Seldin (2023) notes that around 20 terrorist groups are operating more freely. According to Mir (2023), the Taliban have shown a nuanced approach to terrorist groups, selectively enabling and restraining activities of groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS-K. While they have acted against ISIS-K, suggesting efforts to mitigate its threat, the resurgence of al-Qaeda and increased operations by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) from Afghanistan against Pakistan indicate significant internal and external security concerns (Mir, 2023). Despite Taliban claims of mitigating terrorism, including actions against ISIS-K, UN assessments and regional security concerns show a rising terrorism threat in Afghanistan and the broader region (Seldin, 2023).

These threats can be addressed by learning from the strategic errors of state reconstruction. In “Lessons from Afghanistan”, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction provides an analysis of crucial factors that undermined US-state-building efforts. In addressing the terrorist threat, strategies must prioritize sustainable development of economic and social dimensions that provide security and stability and reduce the possible intake of recruits into terrorist groups. Next, they must acknowledge the complexity of the socio-political landscape and the historical context of the region, to tailor efforts to fit the needs of the state. Regional cooperation and involvement are also key to effective counterterrorism efforts, given the transnational nature of terrorist networks. This could be setting sanctions and cutting financial and logistical support mechanisms within and beyond Afghanistan. Additionally, building the security capacity of the Afghan forces alongside governance and political reforms is crucial to determining long-term stability and ensuring strong governance. Similarly, engaging local communities and fostering inclusive dialogue can help tackle grievances that extremists might exploit. And finally, external support should be coherent focusing on long-term goals rather than short-term tactical successes, to prevent Afghanistan from reverting to a hub for terrorist organizations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan faced obstacles due to the country's weak governance, strategic mistakes by the U.S. and its allies, and the endurance of terrorist organizations. This highlights the necessity for developing enhanced strategies to address new security challenges following the NATO forces' departure. The analysis highlights the historical context of Afghanistan's poor governance challenges, exacerbated by strategic errors from the U.S. and its allies, notably in understanding local dynamics and implementing sustainable governance structures. The resurgence of groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS-K, alongside numerous other terrorist organizations operating freely once more post-NATO withdrawal, poses significant internal and external security threats to Afghanistan’s stability. Addressing these threats necessitates learning from past errors, prioritizing sustainable development, and regional cooperation, and acknowledging Afghanistan's socio-political landscape. Strategies should focus on long-term stability and governance reforms while engaging local communities and cutting off support to extremist networks. This approach aims to prevent Afghanistan from reverting to a terrorist haven, emphasizing coherent international support focused on durable solutions rather than immediate tactical gains. References

Daudzai, H. (2021, September 27). The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan: The State Governmental Design at the National Level and the Role of Democratic Provincial Councils in Decentralization at the Sub-National Level.

Fukuyama, F. (2004, April 7). State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. https://doi.org/10.1604/9780801442926

Jones, S. G. (2008). The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad. International Security, 32(4), 7–40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30129790 

Mir, A. (2023, August 16). Two years under the Taliban: Is Afghanistan a terrorist safe haven once again?. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/two-years-under-taliban-afghanistan-terrorist-safe-haven-once-again 

Seldin, J. (2023, August 18). Afghanistan reemerging as a terrorism incubator. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-reemerging-as-a-terrorism-incubator-/7230546.html 

Shad, M. R., & Iqbal, S. (2021, December 31). FROM INTERVENTION TO EXIT: AN ANALYSIS OF POST-9/11 US STRATEGIES IN AFGHANISTAN. Margalla Papers, 25(2), 23–34. https://doi.org/10.54690/margallapapers.25.2.70

Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. (2018, May). https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/stabilization/index.html 

White, J. T. (2022, February 1). Nonstate threats in the Taliban’s Afghanistan. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nonstate-threats-in-the-talibans-afghanistan/